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“Nature and its vital contributions to people, which together 
embody biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services, 
are deteriorating worldwide . . . . Nature is essential for 
human existence and good quality of life. Most of nature’s 
contributions to people are not fully replaceable, and some 
are irreplaceable.”1 
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1. Sandra Diaz et al., Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services: Summary for Policymakers, IPBES 10 (May 6, 2019), https://ipbes.net/system/
tdf/ipbes_global_assessment_report_summary_for_policymakers.pdf?file=1&type=node&id
=35329 [https://perma.cc/YH3H-W8B3]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of all the living things on earth, humans have the unique ability to 
destroy all life. Paradoxically, even though our lives will ultimately be 
destroyed too, we also seem to have the inability to stop the destruction, or 
at least a lack of will to stop it. As the daily litany of new destructions2 piles 
up and both the pace and the quantity increase, each loss is buried in the pile 
beneath humanity’s other problems. When humans start prioritizing, the 
living environment—both flora and fauna—is often neglected, and 
sometimes purposely harmed.3 Even nonliving elements of nature are 
harmed. In short, humans destroy the ecosystems necessary for human 
survival in order to effectuate some other human interest, a lack of balancing 
that is incomprehensible. 
This article turns on its head the idea that if we are better human 
beings, we will behave better toward each other and other living things. This 
article starts instead with the premise that if we learn to value (and treat 
accordingly) all living things, we will be better human beings. Although there 
are undoubtedly several social lenses through which to discuss this idea, the 
intersection of animal law and environmental law provides a place, not just 
for discussion, but also for action.  
Specifically, there are three legal constructs at the intersection of 
animal law and environmental law that could significantly reduce human 
harm to nature: one should be dismantled, one should be strengthened, and 
one should be reconstructed. This article starts in Part I by looking at the 
dichotomy of the animal welfare and environmental movements. Although 
they developed separately and have interests that often compete, the two 
 
2. E.g., Morning Edition: In Brazil, Tens of Thousands of Fires Ravage Amazon 
Rainforest, NPR (Aug. 23, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/23/753642821/in-
brazil-tens-of-thousands-of-fires-ravage-amazon-rainforest [https://perma.cc/A9C2-5PVA]; 
Seth Borenstein, UN Report: Humans Accelerating Extinction of Other Species, AP (May 6, 
2019), https://www.apnews.com/aaf1091c5aae40b0a110daaf04950672 [https://perma.cc/
A9C2-5PVA]. The Amazon fires are having a devastating impact on an entire ecosystem, 
including the indigenous peoples and animals that live in the forests. See Nick Paton Walsh et 
al., As the Amazon Fires Rage, Members of this Indigenous Community Brace for their World 
to Change, CNN (Aug. 29, 2019, 5:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/29/americas/
amazon-rainforest-fires-indigenous-community/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZN5M-BBK2]; 
Shreya Dasgupta, At Least 500 Jaguars Lost Their Lives or Habitat in Amazon Fires, 
ECOWATCH (Sept. 26, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.ecowatch.com/jaguars-amazon-
wildfires-2640630816.html?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1 [https://perma.cc/RCB5-BLUL].  
3. See, e.g., Morning Edition: Amazon Rainforest Fires Put a Spotlight on Illegal Land 
Grabbers, NPR (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/26/754266197/
amazon-rainforest-fires-put-a-spotlight-on-illegal-land-grabbers [https://perma.cc/YLR3-
9Q3G]. The primary cause of the most recent fires in the Amazon was people clearing the land 
for cattle ranches. Id. Brazilian President Bolsonaro supports the ranchers, farmers, loggers, 
and even illegal miners, who are responsible for most of the deforestation and destruction of 
the rainforest. Id. 
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movements do intersect. Part II argues that state “ag-gag” laws4—which 
provide legal cover for the animal cruelty, environmental harms, and social 
injustices caused by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs)5—
should be dismantled and repealed. Part III analyzes the issue of who has and 
who should have constitutional standing under statutes like the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA).6 These statutes that are meant to protect the environment 
and animals could be more effective at doing so with both judicial and 
legislative fixes to allow courts to more often consider their injuries. Finally, 
Part IV tackles the role of environmental law in shifting paradigms of how 
we view the human/nonhuman dichotomy in nature. Legal systems are 
human constructs that can be reconstructed on a framework that redefines the 
legal status of nonhuman animals and elements of nature in order to provide 
ecocentric justice. In the face of some quite dire destructions and losses in 
the ecosystems humans inhabit and depend on for survival, human legal 
systems must safeguard nonhuman interests. 
I.   ANIMAL, VEGETABLE, OR MINERAL: CHARACTERIZING THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANIMAL LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Modern human civilization reflects a struggle between human and 
nature, with humans prevailing most of the time (except, perhaps, when 
confronting natural disasters), and in this context, there may be very little 
difference between animal law and environmental law. Both focus on the 
relationship between the human and nonhuman, be it animal, vegetable, or 
mineral. These concerns are manifest in the animal welfare movement and 
environmentalism, both of which use the law and other tactics to advocate 
for protection of nonhuman interests. But these movements differ in what 
they seek to protect.7 
The animal welfare movement is narrowly focused, not just on 
animals, but on individual animals. Animal law brings in aspects of almost 
every other area of law: criminal law, family law, tort law, constitutional law, 
consumer law, disability law, environmental law, contract law, agriculture 
law, and food law. It would be easy to extend this list. Moving from legal 
issues to the social movement, Tischler and Myers define the concerns of the 
animal welfare movement this way: 
 
4. E.g., Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 
81-30-101 to 81-30-105 (2019); see also Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of 
Laws Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 
(Envt. Law Inst.) 10,960 (Oct. 2012).  
5. See Misha Mitchell, Cries from the CAFOs: A Case for Environmental Ethics, 39 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 67 (2014). 
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018). 
7. There are historical and structural differences as well as those of perspective. See 
David S. Favre, Foreword to WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 
xxiii, xxiii–xxviii (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015). 
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The animal protection movement is comprised of people 
who believe that the lives and interests of animals matter, if 
not always to human beings, then to the animals themselves. 
Animal advocates support the reduction or elimination of 
pain, suffering, abuse, and neglect, as well as eliminating the 
exploitation and unnecessary death of animals. This focus 
on animals includes farmed animals, animals used in 
research and testing, wildlife and captive wildlife, animals 
used in entertainment, and companion animals.8 
More broadly, environmentalists concern themselves with issues of 
air pollution, water quality, land conservation, ecosystem protection, climate 
change, and wildlife management. Tischler and Myers also define 
environmentalism and its impacts: 
Environmentalism pulls in diverse subjects, from 
environmental justice for low-income communities and 
communities of color, to ecotourism and improved 
livelihoods as vehicles for conservation, to the protection of 
biodiversity. Environmentalism reaches land, air, climate, 
and water—from the ocean to surface water and 
groundwater—and the full scope of human activities that 
impact our land, water, and climate.9 
As suggested by these definitions, in the context of protecting 
animals, the distinction between the animal welfare movement and 
environmentalism is often framed as one of scope of interest: individual 
animals versus animal species and their ecosystems. This may be framed as 
concern about domestic animals (including farmed animals) versus concern 
about wildlife. Indeed, sometimes the interests of the two movements clash. 
Consider feral cats, which are devastating to populations of wild songbirds.10 
Animal welfare advocates may advocate for trap-neuter-return programs that 
over time reduce the size of (or eliminate entirely) feral colonies. 
Environmentalists might decry the continued loss of songbirds during that 
time and advocate instead for eradication of the colony. David Favre perhaps 
sounds harsh in saying that animal welfare advocates “don’t give much 
priority to protection of endangered species when it conflicts with other life,” 
and environmentalists rarely “see farm land ecosystems, and there is no room 
 
8. Joyce Tischler & Bruce Myers, Animal Protection and Environmentalism: The Time 
Has Come To Be More than Just Friends, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?, supra note 7, at 387, 389. 
9. Id. at 390. 
10. Scott R. Loss et al., The Impact of Free-Ranging Domestic Cats on Wildlife of the 
United States, NATURE COMM. (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms2380 
[https://perma.cc/MJ39-YP7L]. 
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in their world to focus energy on issues of pets.”11 Nevertheless, as social 
movements with disparate origins,12 they are differently focused and this is 
quite likely how they see each other, if not how they see themselves.  
But distinguishing the two movements also in absolute terms 
suggests a false dichotomy. At least one prominent issue—farmed animals—
is a critical common concern,13 albeit from different perspectives. The animal 
welfare movement is focused on the cruelty of raising animals in “factory 
farms,” or CAFOs. Animal welfare advocates are concerned about the 
welfare of individual animals—even hundreds of thousands of individual 
animals—but there is no concern for the survival of cattle or poultry as 
species. They reveal the horrors of CAFOs and slaughterhouses to demand 
better treatment for animals raised for food. To be sure, in this context 
environmentalists are no more concerned for the survival of cattle or poultry 
as species. They are, however, troubled by the significant environmental 
damage caused by CAFOs, from water pollution to the levels of methane 
released by cattle that contribute to climate change,14 which does contribute 
to extinction of species. But as Tischler and Myers point out, ultimately, both 
environmentalists and animal welfare advocates are concerned that these 
activities that endanger large numbers of individual animals do harm the 
environment and do endanger species.  
[H]uman activity that degrades the environment is a major 
concern, not only for ecosystems, but for the many species 
of animals, and the millions of individual animals who 
depend on the environment for survival. Curbing these 
losses—and ultimately reversing extinction trends—is a 
priority for both the animal protection movement and the 
environmental movement.15 
For both movements, law is perhaps the most effective tool to 
effectuate the ecological and ethical change they seek. Yet for both, a deeply 
ingrained legal tenet is also the most profound impediment to affecting 
change: legally, nonhuman animals—be they domestic or wild—are 
property.16 Neither nonhuman animals nor any other living environmental 
entity has any inherent value under the law. They are either private property 
or public property and are only as valuable as they are to their human owners. 
Laws that protect property are only as effective as the damages assigned for 
 
11. Favre, supra note 7, at xxvii. 
12. See id. at xxiii.  
13. See Tischler & Myers, supra note 8, at 391–98. 
14. Amy Quinton, Cows and Climate Change: Making Cattle More Sustainable, UC 
DAVIS (June 27, 2019), https://www.ucdavis.edu/food/news/making-cattle-more-sustainable/ 
[https://perma.cc/9GTC-9F2N]. 
15. Tischler & Myers, supra note 8, at 395. 
16. Id. at 401. 
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their breach.17 Nonhuman animals and nature, then, are only protected by the 
law to the degree they are valuable to humans, and that value does not always 
outweigh other human interests. 
The interests of animal welfare advocates and environmentalists 
converge at changing the valuation and balancing of interests. “To effectively 
protect nature and animal interests under the law, the law must recognize and 
respect their value, not only their value to humans as resources or private 
property, but their intrinsic value in their own right.”18 But that valuation will 
not change until we transform the laws that dictate how we see nonhuman 
animals. And ultimately, the hypothesis underlying this article is that it does 
not matter if the focus is on individual animals or animal species or other 
elements of nature so long as humans construct a legal system that allows 
both humans and nonhumans to value the individual and wholistic interests 
of nature. 
II.   SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL: MASKING THE ANIMAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ABUSES OF FACTORY FARMING  
The feature-length Australian documentary Dominion19 presents an 
uncompromising, unrelenting, and damning view of animal agriculture. 
“Focusing on the legal, industry-standard practices that occur all over the 
world,” the documentary is two hours of film taken from hidden cameras and 
drones in factory farms and slaughterhouses, showing both “the terrifying 
scale of an empire built on secrecy—and the individual stories of its victims,” 
ultimately questioning “the morality and validity of humankind’s dominion 
over the animal kingdom, [and] advocating not for minor improvements to 
their welfare but for a deeper conversation about our right to exploit those 
we deem inferior to ourselves.”20 
Dominion was filmed in Australia, but other than the scale of the 
industry and its abuses (many more animals are bred and slaughtered in U.S. 
animal agriculture), there are few differences between the horrors shown in 
the film and the same horrors that are largely hidden in the U.S.21 In fact, 
much of the footage in the film would have been illegal to obtain in the U.S. 
Indeed, even though the film’s director was the first person in Australia 
charged under that country’s ag-gag law (for an earlier film),22 his perception 
after making Dominion is that “it is clear as an Australian that our animal 
 
17. Joan E. Schaffner, Valuing Nature in Environmental Law: Lessons for Animal Law 
and the Valuation of Animals, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW?, supra note 7, at 243. 
18. Id. 
19. DOMINION (Aussie Farms 2018). 
20. Dominion: About the Film, AUSSIE FARMS REPOSITORY, https://www.
dominionmovement.com/ [https://perma.cc/RP9W-2YRJ]. 
21. Q&A with Chris Delforce, Writer & Director of Dominion, AUSSIE FARMS 
REPOSITORY, https://www.dominionmovement.com/about [https://perma.cc/Z5CT-2ESG]. 
22. Id. 
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agriculture sector strongly envies the ag-gag laws and Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act successfully introduced [in the U.S.].”23 But the fact that 
Dominion has been screened around the world, receiving both widespread 
acclaim and push-back24 for its powerful truth-telling, demonstrates that 
humans may not be willing to tolerate the animal cruelty and environmental 
degradation caused by modern animal agriculture once they know about it. 
The terminology describing how animals are raised for food—
intensive animal farming, industrial livestock production, factory farms, 
concentrated animal feeding operations—most decidedly does not conjure 
visions of happy cows, lush, green fields, or clear, cool streams. Instead, the 
images evoked—and indeed, the realities—are ugly and dystopian. An 
“animal feeding operation” is a “lot or facility” where animals are “confined 
and fed” for a period of time, but crops and other vegetation are not grown.25 
CAFOs are animal feeding operations that are defined by large numbers of 
animals.26 
More than ninety-nine percent of the estimated ten billion animals 
raised and slaughtered annually in the U.S. are raised and slaughtered in 
CAFOs.27 This method of raising animals for food is harmful certainly to the 
animals, but also to the environment and ultimately to humans. “In addition 
to causing unquantifiable animal suffering, CAFOs put independent family 
farmers out of business, and they create deplorable working conditions for 
employees. CAFOs also create massive externalities in the form of 
environmental destruction while they ravage their vulnerable host 
communities and trample civil rights.”28 At the end of 2018, the 
Environmental Protection Agency reported 20,382 CAFOs in the U.S.29 
The horrific animal abuses common in CAFOs are well-documented, 
mostly by animal welfare activists working undercover. Abuses in the 
industry have been described in case law, ironically not because the treatment 
of animals is illegal, but because documenting that treatment or attempting 
to regulate it are often challenged in court.30 The confinement of laying hens 
 
23. Id. 
24. Joely Mitchell, Industry Braces for Documentary Backlash, QUEENSLAND COUNTRY 
LIFE (Apr. 4, 2018, 6:50 PM), https://www.queenslandcountrylife.com.au/story/5320974/
industry-braces-for-documentary-backlash/?cs=4710 [https://perma.cc/HS2A-628R]. 
25. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2018). 
26. Id. 
27. Christine Ball-Blakely, CAFOs: Plaguing North Carolina Communities of Color, 
18 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 4 (2017). 
28. Id. 
29. NPDES CAFO Permitting Status Report, EPA (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.
epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-09/documents/cafo_tracksum_endyear_2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q8X9-2AFR]. 
30. E.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F. 3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing 
“disturbing” abuses at an Idaho dairy farm and partially overturning Idaho’s ag-gag law); 
Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 862 (2019) (describing the process of force-feeding geese to 
produce foie gras); Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. 
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and breeding sows is perhaps the most well-known issue, and the coverage 
has pressured the food industry to demand changes31 and states to enact laws 
limiting or banning the practice.32 Other largely unknown to the public 
standard industry practices are just as harmful to animals but are legal 
precisely because they are standard industry practices.33 Even people who are 
aware of the facilities in their area rarely see inside the barns, 
slaughterhouses, and processing plants. 
The environmental impacts of farming have been recognized for 
hundreds of years. In 1610, William Aldred successfully sued his neighbor 
for nuisance for “erecting a hogstye so near the house of the plaintiff that the 
air thereof was corrupted.”34 The court determined that “if the stopping of the 
wholesome air, etc. gives cause of action, a fortiori an action lies in the case 
at Bar for infecting and corrupting the air.”35 CAFOs are the source of 
 
Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012) (describing cruelty to non-ambulatory cattle 
at a California slaughterhouse recorded in an undercover film). Not all of the abuse in these 
cases was legal, but none of the cases were criminal cases based on the underlying abuse. 
31. See Maggie Fitzgerald, Beyond Meat’s Stock Pops on Report that Meatless 
Companies Are Struggling to Meet Demand, CNBC (June 4, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://www.
cnbc.com/2019/06/04/beyond-meats-stock-pops-on-report-that-meatless-companies-are-
struggling-to-meet-demand.html [https://perma.cc/XF8T-3JUF]. 
32. See Lydia Mulvany & Leslie Patton, Entire West Coast Goes Cage-Free on Eggs as 
Oregon Signs On, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2019, 1:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-08-15/entire-west-coast-goes-cage-free-on-eggs-as-oregon-signs-on 
[https://perma.cc/NU8N-5M77]. 
33. Dominion sheds light on many. The Aussie Farms Repository has a collection of 
photos, videos, documents, and other resources documenting “beyond doubt that animal abuse 
[is] not only commonplace, but in fact inherent to industries that exploit or use animals for 
profit. Aussie Farms operates under the belief that these industries rely on secrecy and 
deception, using marketing ploys such as ‘humanely slaughtered’ and ‘free range’, and 
imagery depicting happy animals living out their days on rolling green hills in the sunshine; 
and that by breaking down this secrecy and making it easier for consumers to see the truth 
about what their purchases support, the commercialised abuse and exploitation of animals will 
slowly but surely come to an end.” About Aussie Farms, AUSSIE FARMS REPOSITORY, 
https://www.aussiefarms.org.au/about [https://perma.cc/VRX4-FBG9]. Although both 
Dominion and the Aussie Farms Repository focus on Australian factory farming, the 
documented practices are pervasive industry standards worldwide. 
34. William Aldred’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 816 cited in Jonathan Morris, 
Comment, “One Ought Not Have So Delicate a Nose”: CAFOs, Agricultural Nuisance, and 
the Rise of the Right to Farm, 47 ENVT’L L. 261, 263–64 (2017). 
35. Aldred’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821. In the U.S. too, the odorous air pollution from 
animal agriculture drew successful nuisance suits. E.g., Commonwealth v. Van Sickle, 7 Pa. 
L.J. 82 (Pa. 1845), cited in Morris, supra note 34, at 270–71) (facility housing 1,000 hogs that 
created a stench “so intolerable as to make it almost impossible to pass through the street . . . 
without nausea” determined to be a nuisance). With the rise and growth of industrialized 
agriculture and CAFOs, states began to prohibit nuisance claims against agricultural 
operations via “right to farm” statutes intended to protect investment in agricultural operations. 
Id. at 276. In most states, animal agriculture is protected by these statutes. Id. at 278. A more 
recent trend in agricultural protections is adoption of constitutional right to farm and ranch 
provisions in state constitutions, protecting agricultural operations from state regulation. Id. at 
283. Ag-gag laws—the intermediate step between statutory right to farm laws and the more 
recent constitutional protections—are another layer of protection for animal agriculture that is 
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tremendous air and water pollution. Groundwater pollution in the form of 
harmful nitrates and pathogens comes from waste lagoons, storm run-off, and 
flooding in areas near CAFOs.36 In North Carolina alone, the pork industry 
produces over ten billion gallons of waste water annually.37 CAFOs also emit 
very high levels of ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, methane, particulate matter, 
and 400 other volatile compounds into the air.38 Methane, which is produced 
both by the animals themselves and the decay of manure in waste lagoons, is 
a significant contributor to climate change.39 One estimate posits that CAFOs 
produce seventy-five percent of the ammonia pollutants in the U.S.40 The 
noxious gases produced by waste lagoons have sickened and even killed farm 
workers.41 Nevertheless, in 2008, the EPA partially exempted CAFOs from 
reporting release of hazardous substances into the air because, “in most cases, 
a federal response is impractical and unlikely.”42 The D.C. Circuit vacated 
that final rule, saying, “In light of the record, we find those reports aren’t 
nearly as useless as the EPA makes them out to be.”43 
The response of states to the suffering and damage caused by CAFOs 
has not been to regulate CAFOs to improve factory farming, but instead to 
enact laws that keep the harms secret. In 2008, an undercover video released 
by the Humane Society of the United States showed unspeakable torture of 
downed cows inside the Westland/Hallmark Meat Packing Company in 
Chino, California, which supplied the National School Lunch Program. The 
backlash from the video led to the country’s largest beef recall, criminal 
charges against two workers, a massive settlement, the demise of the 
 
clearly a response to animal welfare advocates trying to document the conditions inside animal 
agriculture operations. Ariel Overstreet-Adkins, Essay, Extraordinary Protections for the 
Industry That Feeds Us: Examining a Potential Constitutional Right to Farm and Ranch in 
Montana, 77 MONT. L. REV. 85, 87 (2016). 
36. Ball-Blakely, supra note 27, at 5. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 6; CARRIE HRIBAR, UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING 
OPERATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON COMMUNITIES 5–6 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/
docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ6F-6R5G]. 
39. HRIBAR, supra note 38, at 7. 
40. Ball-Blakely, supra note 27, at 6. 
41. Id.  
42. CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of 
Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 FED. REG. 76,948, 76,956 (Dec. 18, 
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 302, 355). 
43. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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company,44 and a special hearing before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee.45 This 
was not an isolated case, and other undercover video footage showed 
widespread cruelty and violation of food safety laws in the U.S. animal 
agriculture industry.46 Although individual perpetrators and the facilities may 
have been held accountable, instead of tightening laws and enforcement to 
ensure the integrity of the U.S. food supply, several states reacted to the 
undercover videos not with alarm at the treatment of the animals but with 
alarm that undercover videos like these could endanger the industry. These 
states introduced bills, known as ag-gag laws, to prevent not the mistreatment 
of the animals, but the filming or photographing of the mistreatment.47 
Early ag-gag laws were purportedly enacted to combat agroterrorism 
(linked to ecoterrorism) and were intended to protect against property 
damage in animal industries including CAFOs and animal research 
facilities.48 Even so, they contained provisions prohibiting undercover 
filming and photographing,49 suggesting that the objective of combatting 
“terrorism” was not the whole story. In any case, these provisions 
foreshadowed the post-Westland/Hallmark laws, which were clearly focused 
on preventing not property damage, but the economic damage50 that would 
result if consumers had a view behind the scenes of the animal agriculture 
industry. The ag-gag laws that were introduced in twenty-five states after 
Westland/Hallmark are generally characterized as either agricultural 
interference laws that ban recording in agricultural facilities without consent 
or distributing such a recording; agricultural fraud laws that prohibit gaining 
entrance to agricultural facilities under false pretenses, including 
misrepresenting oneself on an employment application; or rapid reporting 
 
44. Helena Bottemiller, Landmark Settlement Reached in Westland-Hallmark Meat 
Case, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2012), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/11/
landmark-settlement-reached-in-westlandhallmark-meat-case/ [https://perma.cc/98ZR-
CT92]; Jane Zhang, Meatpacker Admits Ailing Cattle Used at Slaughterhouse, WALL STREET 
J. (Mar. 13, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120533310279730335 
[https://perma.cc/LR2Z-BCAF]; Meatpacker to Shut Down Permanently After Recall: Report, 
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2008, 12:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hallmark-westland-
meat/meatpacker-to-shut-down-permanently-after-recall-report-idUSN24205620080224 
[https://perma.cc/7ZTZ-9B3L].  
45. See Hallmark/Westland Meat Recall: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agric., 
Rural Devel., Food and Drug Admin. & Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 
110th Cong. (Feb. 28, 2008), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg44333/
html/CHRG-110shrg44333.htm [https://perma.cc/7P8A-X2CX]. 
46. Alicia Prygoski, Detailed Discussion of Ag-gag Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. 
(2015), https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-ag-gag-laws [https://
perma.cc/ZEZ8-UTHB]. 
47. Id.; Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011, 
9:29 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/  
[https://perma.cc/XJC7-D5WZ]. Bittman is credited with coining the term “ag-gag.” 
48. Prygoski, supra note 46. Montana, Kansas, and North Dakota passed this type of 
ag-gag law in the 1990s. Id.  
49. Id. 
50. Id.  
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laws that require reporting of animal cruelty within twenty-four to twenty-
eight hours.51 Rapid reporting laws are especially problematic because they 
seem like they are meant to combat animal cruelty, but really prevent 
whistleblowers from acquiring evidence of a pattern of abuse over time.52 
These laws have not gone unchallenged. Indeed, although they were 
introduced in twenty-five states between 2011 and 2015, they passed in only 
six.53 Utah’s law (a combined agricultural interference/agricultural fraud 
law),54 Idaho’s (also a combined agricultural interference/agricultural fraud 
law),55 and Iowa’s (an agricultural fraud law) have been challenged on First 
Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
grounds.56 All three were initially held unconstitutional.57 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the District of Idaho regarding the agricultural fraud portions of 
Idaho’s law, but the agricultural interference portions remain enjoined.58 The 
validity of the Iowa statute is on appeal, but just after the appeal was filed, 
the Iowa legislature passed another version of an agricultural fraud statute,59 
which is also now being challenged on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.60 
Perhaps to avoid the Fourteenth Amendment challenges, the most 
recent incarnation of ag-gag laws prohibit undercover investigation of abuses 
not just at agricultural and research facilities but at all businesses.61 Lawsuits 
have been filed seeking to enjoin enforcement of the new statutes in Arkansas 
and North Carolina.62 But expanding the scope of ag-gag laws to include all 
corporate misconduct is going in the wrong direction. The better course of 
action would be repeal. 
This new expansion of ag-gag laws is alarming. In order to protect 
the cruel and environmentally damaging practices of industrial animal 
 
51. Id. 
52. Id.  
53. Id. 
54. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2019), held unconstitutional by Animal Legal 
Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1213 (D. Utah 2017). 
55. IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2019), held unconstitutional by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. 
Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1211–12 (D. Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Animal 
Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2018); IOWA CODE § 717A.3A 
(2019), held unconstitutional by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 353 F. Supp. 3d 812, 
826–27 (S.D. Iowa 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-1364 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2019).  
56. Prygoski, supra note 46. 
57. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1213; Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1211–12; Reynolds, 353 
F. Supp. 3d at 826–27. 
58. Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1205. 
59. IOWA CODE § 717A.3B (2019). 
60. Complaint, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 4:19-cv-00124 (S.D. Iowa 
Apr. 22, 2019). 
61. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2018). The two 
statutes are virtually identical. 
62. Animal Leg. Def. Fund v. Vaught, No. 4:19-cv-00442 (E.D. Ark. June 25, 2019); 
PETA v. Stein, 737 F. App’x. 122, 125 (4th Cir. June 5, 2018) (reversing the lower court’s 
determination that the plaintiffs had no standing and allowing the lawsuit to go forward). 
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agriculture, legislators are willing to protect corporate misconduct across the 
board. This underscores the fact that these laws really protect social 
injustices. The director of Dominion says that the film is “about levelling the 
playing field by showing consumers of animal products what they’re actually 
paying for—giving them the chance to make informed decisions and 
hopefully, encouraging a more compassionate and critically-thinking society 
where misleading advertising is no longer taken at face value.”63 But abuses 
inherent in industrial animal agriculture have a much deeper impact than the 
behavior of American consumers. Industrial animal agriculture notoriously 
preys on immigrants—especially undocumented immigrants—who may 
have no choice but to work in inhumane conditions.64  
[One company] has built its business by recruiting some of 
the world’s most vulnerable immigrants, who endure harsh 
and at times illegal conditions that few Americans would put 
up with. When these workers have fought for higher pay and 
better conditions, the company has used their immigration 
status to get rid of vocal workers, avoid paying for injuries, 
and quash dissent.65  
CAFOs are often located in economically disadvantaged areas, often 
near communities of color, where vulnerable residents do not have the 
opportunities or resources to move or ameliorate the deleterious impacts of 
the CAFOs.66  
Ag-gag laws allow the animal agriculture industry to hide practices 
that prey on vulnerable people, animals, and ecosystems, and they mask the 
social and ethical issues created by the industry. Allowing corporations to 
hide the evils inherent in the food system that is crucial to our survival does 
not make humans better, healthier, or safer. 
 
63. Dominion: About the Film, supra note 20. 
64. It is likely not a coincidence that U.S. immigration officials selected the chicken 
processing industry for massive simultaneous raids that resulted in almost 700 arrests for 
immigration violations. See Rogelio V. Solis & Jeff Amy, Largest US Immigration Raids in a 
Decade Net 680 Arrests, AP (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/bbcef8ddae4e43039
83c91880559cf23 [https://perma.cc/BY9G-YLMW]. 
65. Michael Grabell, Cut to the Bone: How a Poultry Company Exploits Immigration 
Laws, NEW YORKER, May 8, 2017, at 46. 
66. See generally Ball-Blakely, supra note 27. 
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III.   STANDING ON THEIR OWN FOUR FEET: LEGAL STANDING FOR 
ANIMALS AND THE ENVIRONMENT67 
In May 2019, the United Nations released a report that revealed the 
shocking reality that one million plant and animal species are in danger of 
extinction due to human activity.68 The report alarmingly states: 
Human actions threaten more species with global extinction 
now than ever before. An average of around 25 per cent of 
species in assessed animal and plant groups are threatened 
. . . suggesting that around 1 million species already face 
extinction, many within decades, unless action is taken to 
reduce the intensity of drivers of biodiversity loss. Without 
such action there will be a further acceleration in the global 
rate of species extinction, which is already at least tens to 
hundreds of times higher than it has averaged over the past 
10 million years.69 
Although this may be the direst warning yet, it is not the first 
recognition that humans have an interest in preserving biodiversity. In 1972, 
President Nixon, in announcing his environmental agenda, recognized “that 
even the most recent act to protect endangered species, which dates only from 
1969, simply does not provide the kind of management tools needed to act 
early enough to save a vanishing species.”70 Nixon proposed a law that 
“would make the taking of endangered species a Federal offense for the first 
time, and would permit protective measures to be undertaken before a species 
is so depleted that regeneration is difficult or impossible.”71 
Hearings on endangered species legislation confirmed that: 
[s]ome sort of protective measures must be taken to prevent 
the further extinction of many of the world’s animal species. 
The number of animals on the Secretary of the Interior’s list 
of domestic species that are currently threatened with 
extinction is now 109. On the foreign list, there are over 300 
species. Further, the rate of extinction has increased to where 
on the average, one species disappears per year . . . . [M]any 
 
67. This section is based on work published previously and updated recently in Stacey 
L. Gordon, The Legal Rights of All Living Things: How Animal Law Can Extend the 
Environmental Movement’s Quest for Legal Standing for Non-Human Animals, in WHAT CAN 
ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?, supra note 7, at 211–41 (2d ed. scheduled 
for publication May 2020). 
68. Diaz et al., supra note 1. 
69. Id. at 3. 
70. The President’s 1972 Environment Program, 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 227 
(Feb. 8, 1972). 
71. Id. 
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of these animals perform vital biological services to 
maintain a “balance of nature” within their environments.72 
Because of these findings, Congress enacted the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA),73 “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of 
endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”74 The underlying concerns 
were important, impassioned, and broad.75 The codified preamble to the law 
states: 
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United 
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of 
economic growth and development untempered by adequate 
concern and conservation; 
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so 
depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or threatened 
with extinction; 
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, 
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and 
scientific value to the Nation and its people.76 
“While each of [the] asserted interests ultimately benefits humanity, 
the ESA provides a comprehensive scheme to preserve and protect 
endangered species themselves in order to provide those benefits.”77  
And yet, at this moment, the ESA itself is in danger. At the same 
time the United Nations report of May 2019 was published, the U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Services were rewriting ESA 
regulations as ordered by the President.78 When he issued the accompanying 
Executive Order, surrounded by industry executives, the President made 
clear the purpose of regulatory reform was to benefit industry and spur 
economic growth.79 The agencies set about to reinterpret the statutory 
 
72. S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2989–90, 
cited in Katherine A. Burke, Comment, Can We Stand for It? Amending the Endangered 
Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision, 75 U. COLO. L REV. 633, 655 (2004). 
73. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884. 
74. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978), quoted in Burke, supra 
note 72, at 638. 
75. See Burke, supra note 72, at 639. 
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1)–(3) (2018). 
77. Burke, supra note 72, at 639. 
78. Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, Exec. Order No. 13,777, 3 C.F.R. 293 
(2018). 
79. Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on Enforcing the Regulatory Reform 
Agenda, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
DCPD-201700138/pdf/DCPD-201700138.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6UT-5Q3Z]. 
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language underlying the ESA regulations,80 and amended specific rules 
regarding determination of species as threatened, consideration of 
unoccupied areas in designation of critical habitat, and presentation of 
economic impacts with regard to listing decisions.81 While the 
Administration and some in Congress praised the amendments, 
environmentalists warn these changes weaken the Act and will make it 
difficult to protect vulnerable plant and animal species, while others in 
Congress believe the amendments do not go far enough and suggest 
amendments to the ESA itself.82 As of this writing, courts are considering 
challenges to the new regulations83 at the same time Congress is considering 
bills to amend the ESA and weaken it even further.84 
While the most immediate task may be to prevent further weakening 
of the ESA, the most important task may actually be to reinterpret and amend 
it, though probably not in the way most of the bills contemplate. Specifically, 
the ESA should be reinterpreted to broaden the definition of injury in citizen 
suits and amended to allow for animal suits. The last half of the previous 
 
80. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the Regulations for 
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 83 Fed. Reg. 35,193, 35,194 (proposed July 
25, 2018) (amending 50 C.F.R. pt. 424). 
81. The final rule still does not allow consideration of economic impacts in listing 
decisions, but it does allow gathering and publishing of that information prior to decision. 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing Species and 
Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020, 45,024–25 (Aug. 27, 2019) (to be codified 
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424). 
82. Adam Aton, Endangered Species: Trump Admin Rolls out Rule Changes to Limit 
Law’s Reach, GREENWIRE (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060931003 
[https://perma.cc/4E9W-NMYA]. 
83. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, No. 4:19-cv-05206 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 
2019) (lawsuit filed by seven environmental and animal welfare groups and the State of 
California); California v. Bernhardt, No. 3:19-cv-06013 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2019) (lawsuit 
filed by seventeen states and the District of Columbia). 
84. In fact, there are competing bills in Congress. H.R. 4348, 116th Cong. (2019) and 
S. 2491, 116th Cong. (2019), both with the stated purpose “[t]o terminate certain rules issued 
by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce relating to endangered and 
threatened species” were introduced on September 17, 2019. The House version would void 
the 2019 amendments to the regulation, but the Senate version would also strengthen the ESA 
by requiring analysis of climate change impacts in listing decisions. S. 2491 § 3(c). 
Meanwhile, the Congressional Western Caucus is working on 19 bills to “modernize” the 
ESA. Endangered Species Act and Wildlife, CONGRESSIONAL W. CAUCUS, https://
westerncaucus.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=14890 [https://perma.cc/3WQ6-9XMT]. 
Rep. Gianforte, who introduced a bill earlier in 2019 mandating that Fish & Wildlife Services 
delist the Yellowstone Grizzly without following ESA delisting procedures, H.R. 1445, 116th 
Cong. (2019), said that the ESA has “become a bludgeoning tool for frivolous lawsuits from 
special interest groups,” and that “ [a]buse of the ESA is also shutting down our forest 
management in Montana. It’s been weaponized, and now we’re at a point where we, instead 
of managing our forests, we breathe them every summer.” Gianforte Bill Outlines Further 
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sentence isn’t as radical an idea as it may seem. Justice William O. Douglas 
recognized the possibility in 1972: 
The critical question of ‘standing’ would be simplified and 
also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that 
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal 
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate 
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads 
and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public 
outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting 
nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral 
of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own 
preservation.85 
Standing is the legal doctrine that protects the constitutional 
requirement that courts consider only “actual cases and controversies.”86 
Adding an animal suit provision to the ESA wouldn’t automatically grant 
every animal standing to seek redress for every injury, but it would expand 
enforcement of the ESA by allowing lawsuits by those who can most easily 
establish injury. Article III standing requires that the plaintiff be able to show 
three elements: injury, causation, and redressability.87 If the plaintiff meets 
that test, the court must determine whether Congress has specifically 
conferred standing. The ESA’s citizen suit provision does that, allowing any 
person to bring a civil suit for the enforcement of the ESA on their own 
behalf,88 but neither the Constitution nor Congress allows a person to bring a 
civil suit to enforce the ESA purely out of interest in animal welfare.89 The 
plaintiff must have a personal stake in the lawsuit, which has been defined as 
an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent and 
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”90  
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Sierra Club v. Morton that 
environmental degradation can constitute injury: “Aesthetic and 
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important 
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular 
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not 
make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”91 
The standing doctrine does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing a citizen 
suit to enforce violations of environmental laws that are causing widespread 
 
85. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing 
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972)). 
86. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). 
87. Id. at 560–61.  
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2018) (emphasis added). 
89. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734–35. 
90. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
91. 405 U.S. at 734. 
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damage, but only if that plaintiff also has a particularized personal injury.92 
For example, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to challenge the denial of 
rulemaking to regulate automobile emissions—which contribute to 
worldwide climate change—because, as a coastal property owner, 
Massachusetts will suffer a specific and imminent injury as sea levels rise.93 
The Court said, “That these climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does 
not minimize Massachusetts’s interest in the outcome of this litigation.”94 
However, virtually all human injury resulting from harm to animals is 
subjective.95 
Cass Sunstein contends that only three categories of persons will 
have personal injuries to sue to protect the interests of animals: those who 
suffer informational injuries, those who suffer aesthetic injuries, and those 
who suffer competitive injuries.96 The recognition that aesthetic injury is 
cognizable for standing purposes is crucial for environmental cases, but in 
the face of widespread extinction, it is not enough. In environmental cases—
including ESA cases—aesthetic injuries are based on a desire to observe 
nature.97 But, to meet the concrete, particularized, and imminent 
requirements for standing, an aesthetic injury must be supported by more 
than an expressed desire to observe nature or wildlife. Plaintiffs must have 
actual plans to travel to specific places in the foreseeable future in order to 
view nature or wildlife or previous activity that suggests similar future 
enjoyment of nature or wildlife but for the statutory violation at issue.98 This 
threshold showing will be difficult to make when the interest at issue is not 
the desire to observe a specific species, but to stop the imminent extinction 
of a million species, virtually all of which a specific plaintiff—even an 
organizational plaintiff—has never seen and has no plans to ever see. The 
interest at issue with these species is not necessarily an aesthetic interest in 
observing them, but a common survival interest in not allowing the 
destruction of ecosystems that support the biodiversity that is also necessary 
for human survival. 
Recognizing an ethical injury need not contravene standing 
jurisprudence. While it is true that this interest may be common to every 
 
92. Id. at 740.  
93. 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007). 
94. Id. at 522. 
95. Burke, supra note 72, at 651. 
96. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1333, 1334–35 (2000). 
97. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (plaintiff desired to 
travel to national forests potentially affected by timber sale regulations); Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (plaintiffs desired to view species endangered by international 
projects); Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727 (plaintiffs wanted to protect wilderness-like quality of 
area that would be affected by road construction); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 
F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (plaintiff had an aesthetic interest in viewing primates living in 
humane conditions). 
98. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 214–19.  
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person, thus allowing virtually anybody to claim standing for redress of the 
injury, existing precedent provides limiting guidance. In Animal Legal 
Defense Fund v. Glickman, standing was not only found by virtue of the 
plaintiff’s past record of visiting the primates daily and being disturbed by 
their living conditions, but also on his background, education, and 
knowledge.99 This suggests not just aesthetic, but an objective, knowledge-
based ethical component to the individual plaintiff’s injury. The requirement 
of specific knowledge protects the jurisprudential standing requirement that 
the injury must be personal and particularized. This would allow scientists 
and animal welfare and environmental organizations to have standing based 
not on their aesthetic interests but on scientifically based ethics.100 
But if the interest is preserving biodiversity, addressing any 
plaintiff’s ethical injury would barely touch the problem; at most, any one 
plaintiff’s injury would reach the several species in one ecosystem, hardly 
the million that are in danger of extinction. This problem raises another 
element of standing—redressability. Redressability requires that “it must be 
‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative’ that the injury will be ‘redressed 
by a favorable decision.’”101 Unless a species population is very small, or the 
animal species’ critical habitat covers a small area, it seems unlikely that one 
case will save even one species, let alone preserve biodiversity on anything 
but a local level. The complexity of environmental harms requires courts to 
adopt an interpretation of redressability that allows for incremental solutions, 
which the Supreme Court did in Massachusetts v. EPA.102 Other courts have 
followed: 
The redressability requirement does not require a plaintiff 
“to solve all roadblocks simultaneously;” rather, a party may 
seek “to tackle one roadblock at a time. . . .” That is 
especially true when the harm complained of is 
environmental. Given the complexity of the natural world 
and the innumerable ways in which human activities affect 
the environment, it is rarely possible to say with certainty 
that a particular verdict will resolve a particular 
environmental harm. Often, environmental harm will result 
indirectly from human activity, occurring later in time or 
some distance away from the activity that caused it, or after 
some intermediate natural process . . . . Environmental harm 
may also result from “cumulative impacts,” i.e., impacts 
“‘which result[] from the incremental impact of the action 
when added to other past, present, and reasonably 
 
99. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 429. 
100. See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1354. Sunstein also suggests scientific injuries as an 
alternative to aesthetic ones but separates them from ethical injuries. 
101. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal citations omitted). 
102. 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007). 
2020] ANIMAL WELFARE LAW AND FRAGILE ECOSYSTEMS 361 
foreseeable future actions . . . .’” Rather than shut the 
courthouse doors to real environmental harms, courts have 
adopted a practical construction of Article III’s case-or-
controversy-requirement that allows a plaintiff to maintain 
an action if it is likely that a favorable verdict will constitute 
a meaningful step towards remedying the alleged harm.103  
In addition to this judicial fix to the problem of standing to enforce 
the ESA, there is a congressional one that, as suggested above, is neither 
radical nor impossible: Congress could grant standing to animals. The Ninth 
Circuit has already suggested as much: 
We see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from 
authorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it 
prevents suits brought in the name of artificial persons such 
as corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, or of 
juridically incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles, 
and mental incompetents.104 
As promising as this sounds, the court has so far been adamant that 
animals do not have standing, even though it once appeared that it had 
granted standing to an animal,105 and that other courts had followed.106 In 
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources, the court said 
that “[a]s an endangered species . . . the bird (Loxioides bailleui), a member 
of the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings its way 
into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right.”107 However, faced with a 
question of animal standing again in Cetacean Community v. Bush, the court 
determined that its earlier statement was dicta, “little more than rhetorical 
flourishes.”108 Having dismissed its own potential precedent for animal 
standing, the court went on to analyze the ESA, National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEPA), Marine Mammal Protection Act, and Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA), and found that none grant standing to animals.109 
More recently, the court doubled-down on this analysis and held that 
Congress similarly did not grant animals standing under the Copyright Act.110 
 
103. Cal. Sea Urchin Comm’n. v. Bean, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1205–06 (C.D. Cal. 2017) 
(internal citations omitted). 
104. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004). 
105. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988). 
106. Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus Marmoratus) v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 
1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council of Volusia Cty., 896 F. Supp. 
1170, 1177 (M.D. Fla. 1995). 
107. Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107. 
108. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1174. 
109. Id. at 1176–79.  
110. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 425–26 (9th Cir. 2018) (the “monkey-selfie” case). 
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Absent an express Congressional mandate, the Ninth Circuit will not find 
standing for animals: 
The court in Cetacean did not rely on the fact that the 
statutes at issue in that case referred to ‘persons’ or 
‘individuals.’ Instead, the court crafted a simple rule of 
statutory interpretation: if an Act of Congress plainly states 
that animals have statutory standing, then animals have 
statutory standing. If the statute does not so plainly state, 
then animals do not have statutory standing.111 
Furthermore, in Naruto v. Slater, the Ninth Circuit found an 
additional hurdle for animal standing that would require congressional 
action: animals literally cannot speak for themselves, but absent next-friend 
status that Congress must grant, neither can anybody else.112 Professor 
Sunstein believes that Congress will grant standing to animals.113 About 
nonhuman standing, he concludes that:  
It would be acceptable for Congress to conclude that a work 
of art, a river, or a building should be allowed to count as a 
plaintiff or a defendant, and authorize human beings to 
represent them to protect their interests. So long as the 
named plaintiff would suffer injury-in-fact, the action should 
be constitutionally acceptable.114 
Regardless of whether the ESA is intended to protect animal and 
plant species (the legislative history suggests that it was) or people (the 
legislative history suggests that too), the reality is that biodiversity is 
essential to the survival of the planet, and humans are rapidly destroying that 
biodiversity.115 Both human and nonhuman animals have interests in 
preserving the multitude of species, both are injured by actions that harm 
species, and both should have access to the courts to seek redress for that 
harm.  
IV.   AND NOW FOR SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT: 
CONSTRUCTING AN ECOCENTRIC LEGAL SYSTEM 
Dominion challenges the idea that humans are superior to and have 
dominion over nonhuman animals.116 As we watch the destruction of nature, 
 
111. Id.  
112. Id. at 422.  
113. Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1359–60. 
114. Id. at 1361. 
115. Diaz et al., supra note 1. 
116. Q&A with Chris Delforce, supra note 21. 
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often in the name of human development, we see that the idea of dominion—
and the need to challenge it—is broader than the human/nonhuman animal 
binary. Over twenty years ago, Professor Jonathan Wiener charted paradigms 
of environmental law that moved from a view in which nature is at a stable 
equilibrium, and humans are separate from and superior to nature, to a view 
in which nature is dynamic and changing, and humans are part of nature117 
(see Table 1 below). In his characterization of the developing paradigms, the 
focus of the role of law shifted from exploitation to conservation to 
preservation.118 As the paradigms shift through four phases (or “faces” per 
Wiener’s nomenclature), the view of humanity shifts from one in which 
humans are morally superior to nature, to one in which humans are morally 
inferior, to one of moral uncertainty.119 
 
Table 1: Wiener’s “Four Faces of Environmental Law”120 
View of Nature View of Humanity Role of Law 




superior to nature 
Exercise human 
dominion over nature; 
exploit 














inferior to nature 
Protect balance of 









Wiener’s contention is that the role of environmental law at any point 
in time was derived from society’s views of nature and the moral status of 
humans in relation to nature.121 At the time he wrote the article, nature was 
understood as dynamic, the “balance of nature” was a fallacy, and humans 
were a part of nature and therefore neither morally superior nor inferior; 
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however, absent the human/nonhuman dichotomy in earlier paradigms, it 
was unclear what the role of law was.122 Wiener could not fill in the final cell 
in the chart—the role of law in this new paradigm—suggesting that the new 
paradigm was just “beginning to construct a legal regime that escapes this 
dichotomy and is based instead on consequences and on incentives to 
promote ecological health.”123 
It is safe to assume the predominant paradigm still views nature in 
constant disequilibrium and chaos, which it must be if only because there is 
no longer any way to argue a nature free from human disruption. However, 
even at the time Wiener charted the development of environmental law 
paradigms, the idea of a view of humanity that is part of nature and morally 
neutral was not as clear, nor necessarily even desirable.124 Given headlines 
about mining development, petroleum exploration, deforestation, climate 
change, and species extinction, it does seem that humans still view 
themselves as morally superior to nature or at least treat nature with moral 
ambiguity, because while we have laws that support preservation of nature, 
we often interpret them in ways that allow exploitation.125 
This may be the crux of the dilemma regarding the role of law in 
Wiener’s new paradigm. Because law is a human construct designed to order 
human society, decide human disputes, and redress human injury, a paradigm 
of the role of law in nature cannot assume a view that humanity is a morally 
neutral part of nature because the interest of humans will always dominate. 
Indeed, as was discussed in the last section, nonhuman natural elements do 
not even have access to the human legal system absent an injury to humans. 
The legal system, therefore, has no interest in addressing harms to nature 
absent co-occurring harms to humans. 
While Wiener tried to define a legal system that would “escape the 
dichotomy,” the legal system in Walter Kuhlmann’s paradigm recognizes the 
dichotomy but not the moral superiority. Kuhlmann’s ecocentric legal 
framework starts with the view of nature as dynamic and interconnected; law, 
in his paradigm, “would require greater consideration in the law for species 
and habitats and would reduce presumptions in the law in favor of human 
desires, i.e. would result in a net change toward a more ecocentric legal 
framework.”126 The role of environmental law is not to erase the 
human/nonhuman dichotomy in nature, but to create a legal system that 
values ecosystems, which humans are a part of but not superior to. The role 
of law, then, is to control for dominion and moral superiority. Using language 
 
122. Id. at 2–3, 17.  
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125. See id. at 149–59.  
126. Id. at 135.  
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from Kuhlmann, the empty cell in Wiener’s chart would read: “Recognize 
biotic values; ‘diminish human dominion;’127 cohabit.” 
The challenge for this view of environmental law is that legally, plant 
and animal species and non-living elements of nature are human property. 
Human dominion over nature is, then, embedded in the system. It is not, 
however, so intrinsic that it cannot be questioned. Steven Wise and the 
NonHuman Rights Project have now filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf 
of four chimpanzees and four elephants, seeking not only their release from 
captivity, but a determination that they are legal persons.128  
Granting legal personhood to nonhuman animals would confer rights 
on nonhuman animals, but would neither grant animals human status nor 
confer human rights, or even absolute rights that would trump human rights. 
If the goal is to create an environmental law paradigm that recognizes the 
human/nonhuman dichotomy in ecosystems but considers nonhuman value, 
humans and nonhuman should not have identical rights; they should have 
rights inherent to their species.129 Constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe 
considered the idea of animal rights and reasoned that they are not so radical 
an idea in constitutional jurisprudence.130 
The NonHuman Rights cases have moved through the New York 
court system, arguing for chimpanzees Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo, 
and are still pending in Connecticut and New York courts on behalf of 
elephants Beulah,131 Karen, Minnie, and Happy. None, so far, have been 
successful, but they also have not slammed shut the door. In denying 
Hercules and Leo’s petition for habeas corpus, Judge Jaffe of the New York 
Supreme Court said:  
Efforts to extend legal rights to chimpanzees are . . . 
understandable; some day they may even succeed. Courts, 
however, are slow to embrace change, and occasionally 
seem reluctant to engage in broader, more inclusive 
interpretations of the law . . . . As Justice Kennedy observed 
in Lawrence v. Texas, “times can blind us to certain truths 
and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.” For now, 
however, given the precedent to which I am bound, it is 
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hereby ordered that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
is denied.132 
In the appeal of Tommy’s case in the New York Court of Appeals, 
Judge Fahey concurred with the Court’s denial of the writ, but issued a 
stunning opinion: 
The question will have to be addressed eventually. Can a 
non-human animal be entitled to release from confinement 
through the writ of habeas corpus? Should such a being be 
treated as a person or as property, in essence a thing? . . . The 
inadequacy of the law as a vehicle to address some of our 
most difficult ethical dilemmas is on display in this matter 
. . . . To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had no right to 
liberty protected by habeas corpus is to regard the 
chimpanzee as entirely lacking independent worth, as a mere 
resource for human use, a thing the value of which consists 
exclusively in its usefulness to others. Instead, we should 
consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with 
inherent value who has the right to be treated with respect 
. . . . The reliance on a paradigm that determines entitlement 
to a court decision based on whether the party is considered 
a “person” or relegated to the category of a “thing” amounts 
to a refusal to confront a manifest injustice.133 
Austrian courts similarly declined to grant personhood to a chimpanzee, 
Matthew Hiasl Pan.134  
However, other foreign jurisdictions have granted rights to 
nonhuman plant and animal species and even to non-living elements of 
nature. In 2008, the Spanish Parliament passed a resolution recognizing that 
great apes have the right to life and freedom.135 The Supreme Court of India 
extended the constitutional right to life to animals in 2014, and in 2019, an 
Indian high court recognized all non-human animals as legal entities136 in an 
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opinion that echoes Kuhlmann’s ecocentric legal framework.137 An Indian 
court has also granted the legal status of “living human entities” to two rivers, 
the Ganges and the Yamuna.138 Like India, New Zealand has not generally 
granted the status of legal person to nature, but it has granted legal status to 
two natural features, the Te Urewera forest,139 and the Whanganui River.140 
The people of Ecuador held a national referendum that resulted in a 
constitutional amendment that grants to nature the rights “to exist, persist, 
maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes 
in evolution,” though the constitutional amendment does not confer legal 
status.141  
Building on all of this, in 2017, the Colorado River Ecosystem filed 
a lawsuit in the federal District of Colorado seeking recognition of the river’s 
“right to exist, flourish, regenerate, be restored, and naturally evolve.”142 
While the court quickly dismissed this case,143 another U.S. river has been 
granted personhood status: the Klamath River was declared a legal person by 
the Yurok Tribe.144 
All of these instances focus either on personhood or rights, but a few 
scholars have proposed another legal concept that vests animals only with a 
narrow set of rights—property rights—and the standing to enforce them.145 
Karen Bradshaw proposes vesting property rights in animals at the ecosystem 
level.146 That property would be held in trust and managed for the benefit of 
the animals inhabiting that ecosystem, including humans who also would be 
one of the animal owners of the ecosystems they inhabit.147 Bradshaw 
highlights several benefits to this system, including the practicality that it 
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may be more palatable to courts than granting animals personhood, and the 
broader focus that would afford rights to more animals than the current 
systems which focus on primates and large mammals.148 This system would 
not protect animals from cruelty nor would it protect the animals the 
personhood movement seeks to protect—certain wild animals in captivity.149 
It would, however, protect habitat and thereby indirectly protect other 
elements of nature in ecosystems. 
While it seems that comprehensive rights and the status to enforce 
them for all of nature is likely a long way off, a legal system that bestows 
rights on individual species and elements of nature would necessarily 
develop a jurisprudence that values nature in a way that moves us toward that 
“ecocentric legal framework” that fractures the destructive idea of human 
dominion over the natural world. Humans would have to stop inflicting 
unnecessary harm on species and natural elements that could legally stand up 
for themselves.  
CONCLUSION 
Peter Singer defines “speciesism” as “an attitude of bias against a 
being because of the species to which it belongs. Typically, humans show 
speciesism when they give less weight to the interests of nonhuman animals 
than they give to the similar interests of human beings.”150 The term is 
properly used to refer to human treatment of animals,151 and as such it can 
only provide a partial explanation for human dominion over all of nature, but 
it is not difficult to extend the attitude as an explanation for the destruction 
of plant species as well, or to the destruction of any other element of nature, 
especially as we are bombarded daily with headlines proclaiming the 
weakening of environmental protections because they limit human economic 
development.  
In the context of a legal system that is a human construct, humans 
are inherently separate from the rest of nature. Yet humans inhabit and are 
part of nature’s ecosystems. A legal system that fosters and allows human 
dominion over nature to the extent ecosystems and the nonhuman elements 
that they are made of—animal, vegetable, and mineral—are destroyed makes 
little sense. Law, however, only values the interests of others to the extent its 
makers provide. But law is a human construct, and it can be reconstructed. 
Its foundational canons and rules change as society changes; if they did not, 
law would become irrelevant. Animal and environmental law, both of which 
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use the legal system to protect nonhuman elements of nature, have never been 
as crucial as they are now because what is endangering both human and 
nonhuman survival is human attitude and activity. Where animal law and 
environmental law intersect is a place to force change. Some changes can 
allow humans to advocate for nonhuman interests; other changes must allow 
the nonhuman elements of nature to champion their intrinsic value and rights 
for themselves. 
 
